Reading Summary of Meditation 4 - Proper name of being
Badiou has argued that in any given situation, structure divides the multiple into consistent and inconsistent multiplicity. But what can really be said about inconsistent multiplicity considering it is never presented in a situation? As Badiou laid out in Meditation One, all presented situations are structured by the count-as-one, thus any given situation is comprised only of consistent multiplicity. Moreover, being that situations are structured consistent multiplicities, all situations are governed by the one. In fact, Badiou suggests, "The one is thereby not only the regime of structured presentation but also the regime of the possible of presentation itself" (p52). Therefore, "Any situation, seized in its immanence, thus reverses the inaugural axiom of our entire procedure. It states that the one is and that the pure multiple--inconsistency--is not" (p52). But this, Badiou thinks, is "entirely natural." That is, any given situation, "not being the presentation of presentation, necessarily identifies being with what is presentable, thus with the possibility of the one" (p52).
The question remains, how is one to fathom inconsistency when it "does not come to light" in any given situation? Being that Badiou has established that the one is not, and that the one is yet the result of an operation; it must be that "'something' of the multiple does not absolutely coincided with the result" (p53). And so it is that "although there is never anything other--in a situation --than the result (everything in the situation is counted), what thereby marks out, before the operation, a must-be-counted" (p53). This "phantom" of inconsistency thus "unhinges" the temptation to re-affirm the thesis that the one is. In fact, Badiou thinks, the being of consistency is inconsistency. That is, "once the entirety of a situation is subject to the law of the one and consistency, it is necessary, from the standpoint of the immanence to the situation, that the pure multiple, absolutely unpresentable according to the count, be nothing" (p53). Badiou writes:
"Just as the status of the one is decided between the (true) thesis 'there is oneness' and the (false) thesis of the ontologies of presence, 'the one is', so is the status of the pure multiple decided, in the immanence of a non-ontological situation: between the (true) thesis 'inconsistency is nothing', and the (false) structuralist or legalist thesis 'inconsistency is not.' It is quite true that prior to the count there is nothing because everything is counted. Yet this being-nothing--wherein resides the illegal inconsistency of being--is the base of there being the 'whole' of the compositions of ones in which presentation takes place....A situation never proposes anything other than multiples woven from ones, and the law of laws is that nothing limits the effect of the count....The 'nothing' is what names the unperceivable gap, cancelled then renewed, between presentation as structure and presentation as structured-presentation, between the one as result and the one as operation, between presented consistency and inconsistency as what-will-have-been-presented....There is not a-nothing, there is 'nothing,' phantom of inconsistency'....The nothing names that undecidable of presentation, which is it unpresentable, distributed between the pure inertia of the domain of the multiple, and the pure transparency of the operation thanks to which there is oneness" (p53-55).
It is here that Badiou moves from "nothing" to "void" with the assistance of Plato's dialogue Timaeus, specifically the notion of an "errant cause," known for its "extreme difficulty for thought" (p55). The notion of the void, though unpresentable as such, is a "necessary figure which designates the gap between the result-one of presentation and that 'on the basis of which' there is presentation" (p55). Or rather, between the count-as-one and the non-one of any situation. The non-one, or the "nothing particular to the situation....wanders into the presentation in the foarm of a subtraction from the count" (p55). Moreover, the void is "neither local nor global, but scattered all over, nowhere and everywhere" (p55). In this way, the void is sutured to being. And again, that every structured presentation "unpresents 'its' void, in the mode of this non-one which is merely the subtractive face of the count" (p55). "The void is the name of being--of inconsistency--according to a situation" (p56).
Remember, it has been argued in the first three meditations that:
1. "that ontology is necessarily presentation of presentation, thus theory of the pure multiple without-one, theory of the multiple of multiples" (p56)
2. "that its structure can only be that of an implicit count, therefore that of an axiomatic presentation, without a concept-one of its terms (without a concept of the multiple)" (p57)
It is here, in Mediation Four, that Badiou offers his third postulate:
3. "that the sole term from which ontology's compositions without concept weave themselves is necessarily the void" (p57)
Furthermore, since the one is not, the void must be multiple. That is, multiple of nothing. In fact, the void "is the first multiple, the very being from which any multiple presentation, when presented, is woven and numbered" (p59). "Naturally, because the void is indiscernible as a term (because it is not-one), its inaugural appearance is a pure act of nomination. This name cannot be specific, it cannot place the void under anything that would subsume it--this would be to reestablish the one. The name cannot indicate that the void is this or that....The consequence is that the name of the void is a pure proper name, which indicates itself, which does not bestow any index of difference within what it refers to, and which auto-declares itself in the form of the multiple, despite there being nothing which is numbered by it....This name, this sign, indexed to the void, is, in a sense that will always remain enigmatic, the proper name of being" (p59).
Badiou has argued that in any given situation, structure divides the multiple into consistent and inconsistent multiplicity. But what can really be said about inconsistent multiplicity considering it is never presented in a situation? As Badiou laid out in Meditation One, all presented situations are structured by the count-as-one, thus any given situation is comprised only of consistent multiplicity. Moreover, being that situations are structured consistent multiplicities, all situations are governed by the one. In fact, Badiou suggests, "The one is thereby not only the regime of structured presentation but also the regime of the possible of presentation itself" (p52). Therefore, "Any situation, seized in its immanence, thus reverses the inaugural axiom of our entire procedure. It states that the one is and that the pure multiple--inconsistency--is not" (p52). But this, Badiou thinks, is "entirely natural." That is, any given situation, "not being the presentation of presentation, necessarily identifies being with what is presentable, thus with the possibility of the one" (p52).
The question remains, how is one to fathom inconsistency when it "does not come to light" in any given situation? Being that Badiou has established that the one is not, and that the one is yet the result of an operation; it must be that "'something' of the multiple does not absolutely coincided with the result" (p53). And so it is that "although there is never anything other--in a situation --than the result (everything in the situation is counted), what thereby marks out, before the operation, a must-be-counted" (p53). This "phantom" of inconsistency thus "unhinges" the temptation to re-affirm the thesis that the one is. In fact, Badiou thinks, the being of consistency is inconsistency. That is, "once the entirety of a situation is subject to the law of the one and consistency, it is necessary, from the standpoint of the immanence to the situation, that the pure multiple, absolutely unpresentable according to the count, be nothing" (p53). Badiou writes:
"Just as the status of the one is decided between the (true) thesis 'there is oneness' and the (false) thesis of the ontologies of presence, 'the one is', so is the status of the pure multiple decided, in the immanence of a non-ontological situation: between the (true) thesis 'inconsistency is nothing', and the (false) structuralist or legalist thesis 'inconsistency is not.' It is quite true that prior to the count there is nothing because everything is counted. Yet this being-nothing--wherein resides the illegal inconsistency of being--is the base of there being the 'whole' of the compositions of ones in which presentation takes place....A situation never proposes anything other than multiples woven from ones, and the law of laws is that nothing limits the effect of the count....The 'nothing' is what names the unperceivable gap, cancelled then renewed, between presentation as structure and presentation as structured-presentation, between the one as result and the one as operation, between presented consistency and inconsistency as what-will-have-been-presented....There is not a-nothing, there is 'nothing,' phantom of inconsistency'....The nothing names that undecidable of presentation, which is it unpresentable, distributed between the pure inertia of the domain of the multiple, and the pure transparency of the operation thanks to which there is oneness" (p53-55).
It is here that Badiou moves from "nothing" to "void" with the assistance of Plato's dialogue Timaeus, specifically the notion of an "errant cause," known for its "extreme difficulty for thought" (p55). The notion of the void, though unpresentable as such, is a "necessary figure which designates the gap between the result-one of presentation and that 'on the basis of which' there is presentation" (p55). Or rather, between the count-as-one and the non-one of any situation. The non-one, or the "nothing particular to the situation....wanders into the presentation in the foarm of a subtraction from the count" (p55). Moreover, the void is "neither local nor global, but scattered all over, nowhere and everywhere" (p55). In this way, the void is sutured to being. And again, that every structured presentation "unpresents 'its' void, in the mode of this non-one which is merely the subtractive face of the count" (p55). "The void is the name of being--of inconsistency--according to a situation" (p56).
Remember, it has been argued in the first three meditations that:
1. "that ontology is necessarily presentation of presentation, thus theory of the pure multiple without-one, theory of the multiple of multiples" (p56)
2. "that its structure can only be that of an implicit count, therefore that of an axiomatic presentation, without a concept-one of its terms (without a concept of the multiple)" (p57)
It is here, in Mediation Four, that Badiou offers his third postulate:
3. "that the sole term from which ontology's compositions without concept weave themselves is necessarily the void" (p57)
Furthermore, since the one is not, the void must be multiple. That is, multiple of nothing. In fact, the void "is the first multiple, the very being from which any multiple presentation, when presented, is woven and numbered" (p59). "Naturally, because the void is indiscernible as a term (because it is not-one), its inaugural appearance is a pure act of nomination. This name cannot be specific, it cannot place the void under anything that would subsume it--this would be to reestablish the one. The name cannot indicate that the void is this or that....The consequence is that the name of the void is a pure proper name, which indicates itself, which does not bestow any index of difference within what it refers to, and which auto-declares itself in the form of the multiple, despite there being nothing which is numbered by it....This name, this sign, indexed to the void, is, in a sense that will always remain enigmatic, the proper name of being" (p59).
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